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ABSTRACT
This article examines the impact of two facilitating conditions for boundary-spanning
behaviour in urban governance networks. While research on boundary spanning is
growing, there is little attention for antecedents. Combining governance network
literature on project management and organizational literature on facilitative and
servant leadership, we examine two potential conditions: a facilitative project man-
agement style and executive support. We conducted survey research among project
managers involved in urban governance networks in order to test these relation-
ships. We found positive relationships between facilitative project management and
boundary-spanning behaviour, while executive support indirectly, via facilitative
management, contributed to boundary-spanning behaviour.
KEYWORDS Boundary spanning; facilitative leadership; executive support; network performance; stimulating
conditions
1. Introduction
Previous research has analysed and indicated the importance of boundary spanners
for network performance and trust building in governance networks (Van Meerkerk
and Edelenbos 2014; Williams 2002). As many public issues today do not fit jurisdic-
tional boundaries and agency silos, cross-boundary interaction is increasingly impor-
tant. This has led to an increasing widespread of network forms of governance
between relatively autonomous actors around complex issues (Koppenjan and Klijn
2004; Sørensen and Torfing 2007). Competent boundary spanners play a key role in
these governance networks, as they are organizational members who are able to link
the organization or constituency they represent with its environment (Steadman
1992; Tushman and Scanlan 1981). They are engaged in building sustainable relation-
ships between relevant organizations in their organizations’ environment, informa-
tion transfer across their organizational boundary, translation across boundaries and
mobilizing support within the environment, and their home organization for devel-
opments in the network. These boundary-spanning activities are important for
connecting different actors and their interests, for building trust between those
actors, and to help improve coordination around decision-making and implementa-
tion in governance networks around complex public issues (Van Meerkerk 2014).
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While the literature on boundary spanning is growing (as e.g. a simple search in
the database Scopus will verify1; cf. Williams 2013), empirical research on the impact
of contributing factors on boundary-spanning behaviour is rather scarce. This holds
especially for boundary-spanning behaviour in the context of governance networks.
By far most of the literature on boundary spanning focuses on the effects of
boundary-spanning behaviour, for example, on team performance (Ancona and
Caldwell 1992), absorptive capacity (Ebers and Maurer 2014), innovation
(Tushman 1977), or network performance (Van Meerkerk and Edelenbos 2014).
Far less attention has been paid to facilitating conditions or antecedents of bound-
ary-spanning behaviour (Lee and Sawang 2016). And if so, it is mostly focused on
either general environmental characteristics of the organization (e.g. Bielefeld 1992)
or personal characteristics, such as competences (e.g. Williams 2002) and personal
networks (e.g. Brion et al. 2012), of the boundary-spanning individual. In literature
on network governance, we lack understanding about which network conditions and
behavioural circumstances influence the work of boundary spanners and (subse-
quently) network performance (cf. Klijn 2008; Lecy, Mergel, and Schmitz 2014). In
this article, we therefore examine the effects of two potential facilitating conditions.
We theoretically argue that facilitative project management and executive support
(support by principals) can be considered relevant contextual aspects influencing
boundary-spanning behaviour in governance networks, which subsequently enhance
trust-building among network actors and network performance. We focus our dis-
cussion on facilitating conditions in relation to boundary-spanning behaviour, but we
put this in a more integral model by also testing their (indirect) effects on trust and
network performance.
In order to empirically examine these relationships, we conducted survey research
on complex urban projects in the four largest cities in The Netherlands. These
projects, like regeneration of deprived areas, are embedded in networks, in which
different governmental agencies, commercial actors, non-for-profit organizations,
and residents reshape urban areas, and are dependent of each other, as these projects
cross different organizational and jurisdictional boundaries (Healey 2006; Klijn,
Steijn, and Edelenbos 2010).
2. Context of research: governance networks around complex urban
development projects
In this article, the concept of governance networks refers to more or less stable
patterns of social relations between mutually dependent actors around boundary-
crossing public issues, and which are formed, maintained, and changed through
interactions between the involved actors (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). These networks
typically emerge as a response to complex policy issues that cannot be effectively
addressed by a single actor but require collective actions of more actors (Sørensen
and Torfing 2007; Lecy, Mergel, and Schmitz 2014). Such issues cross different
organizational, jurisdictional, geographical, societal, and/or functional boundaries
and have a multi-value character. This leads to relatively high levels of interdepen-
dency between actors, by which actors have to negotiate and – to some extent – have
to combine their resources and knowledge to achieve qualitatively good outcomes
(Agranoff and McGuire 2001). The specific set of actors involved in governance
networks differ per situation and issue, but in general, they include a combination of
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public, private, and societal actors. In some occasions, the network will be centred
around a public–private partnership, whereas in other circumstances, the (core of
the) network will be more centred on government–society relationships, for example,
as a consequence of citizen participation efforts or citizen initiatives.
Also in the field of urban development, such a transition towards network forms
of governance has been observed (e.g. Healey 2006). Urban development projects,
such as urban regeneration initiatives, touch upon various utility functions and
stakeholders. Urban development projects are boundary-crossing public issues,
often including a mix of spatial functions such as infrastructure, housing, social
facilities (schools, sports facilities), business areas, commercial strips, and green/
recreational areas. They often involve a variety of governmental and non-govern-
mental organizations, such as housing associations, private developers, societal inter-
est groups, and different governmental organizations. According to Lowndes and
Skelcher (1998), the emergence of these networks around urban development pro-
jects, besides increasing resource interdependencies, is often driven by a demand to
provide integrative responses to complex urban issues within an increasingly frag-
mented organizational landscape.
The above definition and characteristics of governance networks do not say any-
thing about the degree and the quality of interaction and the level at which common
objectives are formulated, let alone achieved. Governance networks are characterized
by interaction complexity (Teisman, Van Buuren, and Gerrits 2009), referring to the
density and multiplicity of relationships between actors in the network. Actors in
governance networks can be strongly or loosely coupled. The different organizations
in the networks that are part of this research are more loosely related, as compared to,
for example, policy implementation networks around public services Provan and
Kenis 2008). The focus in this research is on issue-specific networks since they
emerge around concrete urban development projects, like regeneration of certain
city districts where e.g. city representatives, private project developers, and residents
form a temporary actor network in developing and implementing the project. In
these networks, there is a strong diversity of involved organizations, interests, and
perceptions.
2.1 The importance of boundary spanners for trust building in governance
networks and network performance
The realization of good network performance in governance networks calls for
connective capacity (Edelenbos and van Meerkerk 2015; Klijn, Steijn,
and Edelenbos 2010; Ysa, Sierra, and Esteve 2014). Boundary spanners and trust
are important building blocks of this connective capacity. In this research, we build
on previous research in which we have theorized and empirically tested the (positive)
effects of boundary-spanning behaviour on trust building and network performance
(see Van Meerkerk and Edelenbos 2014). Through their role in information
exchange, their relational activities, and their feeling for the interests and social
constructions of other actors in the network, competent boundary spanners enhance
trustful relationships between actors in the governance network.2 Moreover, with
their role in increasing the flow of information, and translating information across
organizational boundaries, connecting individuals and processes across organiza-
tional boundaries, competent boundary spanners contribute to the performance of
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governance networks. Similar results are found in other research on the effects of
boundary spanners on trust in and performance of inter-organizational settings (e.g.
Ebers and Maurer 2014; Brion et al. 2012). Therefore, we are not going deeper into
these relationships here, as our interest lies in extending this conceptual model by
going deeper into the facilitating conditions, which may trigger and enhance bound-
ary-spanning behaviour of network actors.
3. Facilitative project management as a stimulating condition for
boundary-spanning behaviour
Our study focuses on the role of other actors’ behaviour which might trigger
boundary-spanning behaviour important for realizing network performance, namely
that of key figures in governance networks dealing with urban development projects:
project managers and (political) executives. In this way, we aim to contribute to
literature on boundary spanning in governance works by connecting it with project
management literature and organizational literature on facilitative and servant leader-
ship. First, we will go deeper into the role of leading project managers. Next, we go
deeper into the role of executive support.
Besides their direct role in the development, coordination, and implementation of
urban development projects, we argue that project managers can also play an
important role in creating a context in which boundary-spanning behaviour and
cooperation of actors in governance networks is triggered. In governance network
literature, the general focus is mainly on direct effects of managerial strategies on
network performance (Klijn, Steijn, and Edelenbos 2010; Meier and O’Toole 2007;
Ysa, Sierra, and Esteve 2014). However, how project managers can enhance bound-
ary-spanning behaviour of actors which are part of their network, taking potential
cascading effects on network performance and trust into account, is less examined.
To examine this dimension of project management, we build on organizational
literature on facilitative leadership and servant leadership. This literature pays atten-
tion to the role of leaders in creating a context in which a team operates effectively
(Pirola-Merlo et al. 2002). In the same line, literature on collaborative governance
have also indicated the importance of a facilitative leadership style for effective
collaboration and communication between organizations to emerge (Ansell and
Gash 2008). In relation to project performance, the effects of facilitative leadership
are considered to be indirect. In their study on team climate and performance, Pirola-
Merlo et al. (2002) found a direct effect of facilitative leadership on team climate,
which subsequently affected the performance of teams. Whereas (organizational)
literature on facilitative leadership stresses the role of leaders in encouraging relation-
ship building among team members, literature on servant leadership emphasizes
empowerment, delegation, and encouragement of team members (Stone, Russell,
and Patterson 2004). According to Liden et al. (2008, 162), ‘Servant leadership differs
from traditional approaches to leadership in that it stresses personal integrity and
focuses on forming strong long-term relationships with employees.’ Furthermore, it
also unique in that it is sensitive to the needs of numerous stakeholders and extends
outside the organization: servant leaders serve multiple stakeholders, including their
communities and society as a whole (Liden et al. 2008).
Both constructs of facilitative leadership and servant leadership can inform our
development of a facilitative dimension of project management that may enhance
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boundary-spanning behaviour in governance networks. Although there are several
dimensions identified as being part of a facilitative and servant leadership style, we
focus on empowerment and facilitation, as these are interesting dimensions for
project management research in the context of governance networks.
Empowerment is about encouraging and facilitating others in identifying and solving
problems and is considered to be a key dimension of servant leadership (Liden et al.
2008; Van Dierendonck and Nuijten 2011). Empowerment aims at fostering a
proactive, self-confident attitude among team members, giving them a sense of
personal power. Specifically in dealing with complex projects, empowerment of
other actors can stimulate commitment (Guastello 1995; Sarin and McDermott
2003). This can also enhance the performance of urban development projects as
network participants are stimulated to come up with their own initiatives, facilitating
the development of a more integrative and diverse project. Participation is therefore
also a key element of a facilitative style (Sarin and McDermott 2003). Facilitative
project managers invite actors’ active involvement in the development of the project
as a whole.
A facilitative management style is further characterized by engaging in activities
that stimulate relationship building among different actors in the network.
Facilitative management aims at creating a constructive platform for interaction
and dialogue between actors. In this respect, a facilitative project manager will be
focused at organizing informal and face-to-face meetings between actors. Face-to-face
communication has both a substantive as well as a process function. It facilitates
boundary-spanning activities such as information exchange and it is especially
important in the exchange of tacit knowledge (Asheim, Coenen, and Vang 2007).
Furthermore, it is highly important for exchanging mutual commitment and building
a group identity (Ostrom 1998). Marzano, Carss, and Bell (2006) note that a
combination of informal, team building events and meetings/workshops is important
for enhancing mutual understanding, stimulating cross-boundary interaction. In the
same line, Ansell and Gash (2008, 558) note that face-to-face dialogue ‘is at the core
of the process of breaking down stereotypes and other barriers to communica-
tion [. . .].’
In short, the manager as facilitator is focused on relationship building and creating
commitment among network actors. They are focused on creating an environment in
which representatives of organizations with different interests and perceptions
become more willing to cross their organizational, professional, and/or social bound-
aries and invest in boundary-spanning activities. Network participants get to know
each other and feel comfortable to share information. Moreover, this will enhance
their feeling for the interests and perceptions of other actors in the network. Building
on the literature discussion, we therefore formulate the following hypothesis:
(H1) A facilitative management style will foster boundary-spanning activity in the
governance network.
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4. Executive support as a facilitating condition for boundary-spanning
behaviour
Project managers do their job under the supervision of a governmental official who is
held responsible for the success and failure of a project. This principal is an admin-
istrative (not necessarily a political) officer. In a hierarchical position/relation, the
project manager gets the mandate to prepare and implement a specific project or
policy (Meredith and Mantel 2000); the administrative officer is then held accoun-
table by the controlling politicians. This structure is common in line organizations in
which different hierarchical levels are created in developing policy, assigning people
to preparing, and implementing policies and projects (Meredith and Mantel 2000;
Buijs and Edelenbos 2012).
The principal attention to projects differs; some projects get high attention due
to their political sensitivity (d’Herbemont and Cesar 1998). Executive managers
often times stay on top of these dossiers and closely monitor activities. Other
projects are less interesting and relevant to administrative officers. In these cir-
cumstances, it is known that project managers experience difficulties to get
administrative officers and executive managers interested, aligned and committed
to their projects.
Kerzner (1987) argues that executive commitment to project management is one
of the important critical success factors for project excellence. ‘Project management is
unlikely to succeed unless there exists visible support and commitment by executive
management’ (ibid: 34). The higher level of management is needed to rapidly respond
to potential problems in the project implementation. This attention may be directed
internally, to political/higher organizational levels or externally to customers and user
of the output of projects.
In organization theory, there has been quite some attention to the concept of
commitment. There has been substantial research on commitment to goals, to jobs,
to organizations, to courses of action and strategic configurations. This research
approaches commitment as the state of being bound or obligated; it is about the
state or quality of being dedicated to something or someone (Hambrick and Cannella
1993). According to Stratman and Roth (2002), executive commitment is the (top)
management willingness to support projects by allocating the needed resources (e.g.
human, planning, technical, and budgetary means) for successful project implemen-
tation. Executive managers assign resources also for the long term. Executive man-
agers are enthusiastic about the potentials of the project and invest time and attention
to understand the project.
However, executive support doesn’t imply that top managers want to stay on top
of the project and the progress it makes. By constantly interfering with project
managers’ daily business, the project implementation will make them authoritative
in making decisions. Executive support in this view also means that executive
managers will provide discretionary space for project managers to become responsive
and responsible people in preparing and implementing the projects (Stratman and
Roth 2002). Managers working with a precise assignment from their political princi-
pal or from their organizational context have less opportunity to be responsive
towards their environment. Moreover, when project manager constantly need the
explicit backing of executive managers, an efficient implementation of the project
implementation will be hampered (Crawford et al. 2003). This also means that line
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managers will end up in doing the daily business of project managers. Executive
managers must keep oversight but need not to be bothered by project implementa-
tion details. Therefore, the mandatory space of projects managers – and not too
much bureaucratic interference – is important to implement the project in an
efficient and effective way (Crawford et al. 2003).
Executives often times determine the assignment for project managers. This
assignment can be defined in different ways ranging from strictly to loosely defined.
In the latter situation, the project manager has much room to manoeuvre and much
mandatory space (Lipsky 1984). This more or less open assignment also opens up the
possibility for the stakeholders to get involved and active. Wide boundary judgements
regarding context and participation lead to more opportunities for stakeholder to
develop stakeholder engagement and boundary-spanning activities (Ebers and
Maurer 2014; Van Meerkerk, Van Buuren, and Edelenbos 2013).
Hence, executive support is characterized by showing both commitment by
providing support and resources, but without detail interference. We therefore expect
that executive support will foster facilitative management, as managers get more
room to develop and enact a facilitative management style:
(H2) A higher level of executive support will foster a facilitative management style.
Furthermore, we expect that executive support will enhance the boundary-span-
ning behaviour of network actors as they have more incentives to invest in boundary-
spanning activities (cf. Ebers and Maurer 2014). This leads to the following
hypothesis:
(H3) A higher level of executive support will foster boundary-spanning activity in the
governance network.
Figure 1 shows the conceptual model we will test, combining the various hypoth-
eses based on the previous sections. As addressed before, H4, H5, and H6 are
previously examined but tested again in this extended model.
H1 H4
H2 H3 H5
H6
Trust
Network
performance
Boundary
spanning
activity
Facilitative
project
management
Executive
support
Figure 1. Conceptual model.
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5. Methods
5.1 Sample and data collection
We collected data from a web-based survey held in 2011 (April–July) among leading
project managers in the four largest cities of The Netherlands (Amsterdam,
Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht3) and managers within two private firms (P2
and DHV) that operate as project managers in these four cities (see Table 1). Each
respondent is a manager involved in specific urban projects in one of the four cities.
No significant statistical differences exist between respondents from the four different
municipalities or consultancy firms according to the ANOVA tests comparing the six
groups. The managers are involved in a variety of urban projects, but generally the
projects concern the restructuring of parts of a city. Some of the projects concern
restructuring/building dwellings and community facilities in a neighbourhood; others
are more focused at business functions and/or commercial functions (shopping malls
and so forth). The study considers the group of interdependent actors around the
urban projects as the network; this is also how it was presented to the survey
respondents. Surveys were sent (with one reminder and a phone reminder) with
the consent of their organizations to all project leaders of urban projects in imple-
mentation. We explicitly selected the project managers because they know what is
going on in the surveyed projects and are also equipped to answer specific questions
concerning other actors in the network, project management and relationship with
principal, and so forth. To safeguard the independence of our data, we arranged with
participating organizations that they send e-mails to each leading project manager of
a specific urban project. In this way, we made sure we had one manager for each
project. In total, 288 project leaders from the four municipalities and 57 project
leaders from the two consulting firms were approached. Respondents were asked to
fill in the survey for the specific urban project of which they were project leader. This
means that data were collected for 141 projects, as 141 managers answered the
survey. Table 1 describes the population and the response rate (40.9 per cent).
An issue with surveying a population like this is that a list of all urban projects in
the Netherlands simply does not exist. We do believe that our approach has resulted
in a representative response of project managers involved in urban projects in the
four cities we studied. The cooperation with the local governments and the private
firms resulted in an inclusive list of managers leading urban projects in these cities.
The response rate of 41 per cent is more than average for an e-mail survey (Sheehan
2001). Based on the pretest of the survey with the panel of participants, the response
rate, and the discussion with project managers in a post-survey seminar (open for all
project managers in the four municipalities in which we discussed the results of the
survey), we have good reasons to believe that the projects reported by the survey
respondents are representative for the population of urban projects in the cities we
studied.
Table 1. Population and response of the survey.
Population Response (absolute) Response (percentage) (%)
Municipalities (4) 288 117 40.6
Private organizations (2) 57 24 42.1
Total 345 141 40.9
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The organizations involved actively participated in the survey in two ways. First,
they organized the e-mailing to the project managers and encouraged them to
participate in the survey. Second, we held three preparation sessions with eight
project managers from the four participating cities to pretest the survey question-
naire. In these sessions, we discussed the relevance of the items and whether they
understood all the survey questions. In this way, we were able to improve our
questionnaire: we added some items and we changed the formulation of questions.
In the next section, we present and discuss the items that we used to measure our
core variables. These items are largely derived from the scientific literature, using
existing scales.
5.2 Characteristics of the networks around urban projects included in this
study
The urban projects can be described as complex projects developed within govern-
ance networks. The networks around the projects on which the managers reported
mostly included more than ten organizations (66 per cent). Most of the networks
included societal interest groups (94.3 per cent), private developers (78.6 per cent),
architectural firms (79.4 per cent), housing associations (60.7 per cent), and different
governmental organizations (other local governments, regional government, and
national government).
We also checked whether the urban projects were really boundary-crossing public
issues. We measured this by focusing on task complexity: how many and what kinds
of development and/or spatial activities are included in the project (Klijn, Steijn, and
Edelenbos 2010)? Consequent to the preparation sessions with the eight project
managers, we asked about six different kinds of spatial activities/tasks: infrastructure
(rail and public highways), water management, housing, social facilities (schools,
sports facilities), development and/or regeneration of business areas, and develop-
ment of city parks (cf. Klijn, Steijn, and Edelenbos 2010). Measured on a 5-point
Likert scale, on average more than three of these tasks (M = 3.76) play a medium-to-
large part in the projects, which confirms the boundary-crossing nature of the
projects.
5.3 Measurement of variables
In this section, we discuss the different scales we used to measure our core variables
facilitative management, executive support, boundary-spanning activity, trust, and
governance network performance. Table 2 presents the specific items of the scales,
their factor loadings, and the construct reliabilities. In the subsequent section, we
discuss the convergent and discriminant validity of the measurement model.
5.3.1 Facilitative management
Although various literature examines facilitative dimensions of leaders or project
managers, we could not find an existing scale measuring facilitative project manage-
ment. In order to develop a reliable scale, we build on scales in the business literature
measuring servant and facilitative leadership roles and literature discussing facilitative
management behaviour. We used horizontal rating scales to measure more accurately
what prevails in the management style: a facilitative or a non-facilitative management
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Table 2. Measurement items and constructs’ reliability.
Constructs and items
Factor
loading
Corrected item-to-
total correlations
Alpha/
Composite
reliability
Facilitative management – 10-point rating scale. You are
as manager in the execution of your task, focused at
(1) preparing and organizing formal meetings with
organizations (official meetings, public consultation) with
organizations towards a focus on preparing and
organizing informal meetings with organizations (joint
work sessions, network meetings, drinks) (10) (R)
.61 .46 .65/.65
AVE: .38
(2) involving organizations’ active involvement only in the
part for which it is responsible towards a focus on
involving organizations’ active involvement in the
development and decision-making about the project in
its whole (10) (R)
.62 .48
(3) restricting the opportunities/space for other
organizations to develop initiatives within the project
towards a focus on providing as much as possible
opportunities/space for other organizations to develop
initiatives within the project (10) (R)
.62 .45
Executive supporta
(1) My principal is strongly committed to this project .70 .58 .74/.76
AVE: .53(2) My principal succeeds in generating resources and
attention to this project
.92 .69
(3) My principal provides me room the manoeuvre
(mandatory space) to execute the project
.51 .44
Boundary-spanning activitya
(1) In this project, there are many persons active who are
able to build and maintain sustainable relationships with
different organizations in the network
.70 .59 .84/.84
AVE: .52
(2) In this project, there are many persons active who have a
feeling of what is important and what matters for other
organizations in the network
.78 .71
(3) In this project, there are many persons active who take
care of a good information exchange between the
network and their home organization
.79 .73
(4) In this project, there are many persons active who make
effective connections between developments in the
network and internal work processes of their home
organizations
.71 .66
(5) In this project, there are many persons active who are
able to mobilize their home organization in a timely
manner in relation to developments in the network
.60 .54
Governance network performancea
(1) Do you think that innovative ideas have been developed
during the project?
.58 .50 .76/.78
AVE: .42
(2) Do you think that different environmental functions
have been connected sufficiently?
.67 .57
(3) Do you think that the solutions that have been
developed really deal with the problems at hand?
.72 .60
(4) Do you think that the developed solutions are durable
solutions for the future?
.66 .52
(5) Do you think that – in general – the benefits exceed the
costs of the cooperation process?
.59 .48
(Continued )
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style. Horizontal rating scales provide two opposite attitude positions and ask
respondents to show where on the 10-point scale – in between two opposites –
their own view falls (De Vaus 2013).
(1) Facilitating relationship building. A focus on formal/official meetings, such as
public consultation meetings, official advise meetings, towards a focus on
informal meetings and relationship building, such as network meetings,
joint working sessions, drinks (building on Hirst and Mann 2004);
(2) Integrative participation. Involving organizations’ active involvement only in
the task/part for which it is responsible towards involving organizations’ active
involvement the development and decision-making about the whole/integral
project (building on Sarin and McDermott 2003);
(3) Empowering. Restricting the opportunities/space for other organizations to
develop initiatives within the project towards providing as much as possible
opportunities/space for other organizations to develop initiatives within the
project (Ebers and Maurer 2014; Teisman 2005).
5.3.2 Executive support
As no existing and proven scale for executive support exists, we build a new scale for
this variable based on three indicators derived from the literature. For these three
indicators, the respondents were asked to score the statement on a 5-point Likert
scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
(1) Executive commitment. Commitment is an important aspect in indicating the
level of executive support to a project (Kerzner 1987; Stratman and Roth
2002). We used therefore the following statement: ‘My principal is strongly
committed to this project;’
(2) Resources mobilization. Executive support is also measured by the level the
principal is able to generate and allocate resources (money, time, attention) to
the project (Crawford et al. 2003; Kerzner 1987). We used this statement in
our questionnaire: ‘My principal succeeds in generating resources and atten-
tion to this project;’
Table2. (Continued).
Constructs and items
Factor
loading
Corrected item-to-
total correlations
Alpha/
Composite
reliability
Trusta
(1) The parties in this project generally live up to the
agreements made with one another
.54 .49 .80/.80
AVE: .45
(2) The parties in this project give one another the benefit
of the doubt
.67 .60
(3) The parties in this project keep in mind the intentions of
the other parties
.81 .69
(4) Parties in this project can assume that the intentions of
the other parties are good in principle
.64 .57
(5) Parties in this project feel a good personal connection
with one another
.68 .61
aThese items were measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree.
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(3) Mandatory space. Important aspect of executive support is the extent to which the
executive provides room to manoeuvre for project managers and thus allowing
them mandatory space in preparing and implementing the project (Lipsky 1984;
Ebers and Maurer 2014). We used the following statement: ‘My principal pro-
vides me room to maneuver (mandatory space) in executing the project.’
5.3.3 Boundary-spanning activity
We used our previously tested scale on measuring boundary-spanning activity in
governance networks (Van Meerkerk and Edelenbos 2014). This scale consists of
five items (see Table 2) distinguishing different boundary-spanning activities,
such as good information exchange between the network and the home organi-
zation (e.g. Tushman and Scanlan 1981), building and maintenance of sustain-
able relationships between organizations in the network (Williams 2002; Klijn,
Steijn, and Edelenbos 2010), and making effective connections between devel-
opments in the network and work processes in the home organization (cf.
Steadman 1992). In the survey, we asked the respondents whether they thought
there were many persons active in the network who show these kinds of
activities.
5.3.4 Performance of governance networks
There has been much discussion in the governance literature on how to measure
performance of governance networks. We want to stress that there is no particular
best approach (e.g. Provan and Milward 2001). In urban governance networks,
multiple stakeholders are involved which pursue different goals. Therefore, picking
a specific goal of one of the nodes to measure network performance is not considered
adequate (cf. Provan and Milward 2001). Measuring network performance is also
problematic because policy processes in governance networks are lengthy and actors’
goals are likely to change over time (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). This problem is
addressed in this article by using perceived network performance as a proxy for these
outcomes and by using more than one criterion to measure them. From earlier
research and the literature, five different dimensions to measure performance were
distinguished (see Klijn, Steijn, and Edelenbos 2010): (1) the innovative character of
the outcome; (2) the integrative aspect of the solution, that is, the way in which the
plan represents different environmental functions (housing, recreation, and so on);
(3) the problem-solving capacity of results, that is, the extent to which the solutions
really address the problem; (4) the robustness of the results, that is, the future
robustness (time frame) of the results; and (5) the relationship between the costs
and benefits: the costs of the plan should not overrun the benefits of a project. The
appropriateness of these criteria to measure performance was checked and confirmed
by the panel of respondents participating in the pretest of the survey questionnaire.
This approach of measuring network performance is still a proxy and can be
improved in future research by further elaborating the five different dimensions
and by including other data.
5.3.5 Trust between actors in the governance network
To measure trust within the network, we build strongly on the existing scale of Klijn,
Edelenbos, and Steijn (2010), consisting of different dimensions derived from the
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business literature, including the notions of agreement trust, benefit of the doubt,
reliability, and goodwill trust. Because the project managers in the sessions to
improve our questionnaire argued that for them an important additional element
of trust is ‘feeling a good connection with the other actors,’ we improved the scale by
adding this aspect of trust.
5.4 Reliability and validity
The measurement model was first examined for convergent and discriminant valid-
ity, based on confirmatory factor analyses. All factor loadings are larger than .50 (see
Table 2), a very conservative cut-off level (Hair et al. 1995), which is a first important
indicator demonstrating convergent validity. However, as the factor loadings of the
(new) construct ‘executive support’ show quite some variation (ranging from .51 to
.92), we examined the possible existence of a second latent factor (distinguishing
different types of executive support). We ran various explorative factor analyses
(solely on the three items of the scale and together with the other construct items
of our model) but did not find a second or separate latent factor in our data.
Moreover, the explorative factor scores are more in the same range, that is, varying
between .70 (item on ‘providing room’) and .88 (item on ‘generating resources’). As
this could also be (partly) due to limited data on the principal – project manager
relationship, further research might specify this scale.
Furthermore, the composite reliability indexes of the three scales all exceed the .60
threshold (Fornell and Larcker 1981). To further assesses the reliability of the
measures, we computed corrected item-to-total correlations and Cronbach’s alphas.
All items had corrected item-to-total correlations that were greater than .40, which
represents a general threshold (Field 2005). All Cronbach’s alphas exceeded the
widely accepted cut-off value of .70, accept the facilitative management scale (.65).
To establish discriminant validity, we compared the average variance extracted
(AVE) with the squared inter-construct correlation estimates (SIC). The AVE of all
five constructs is larger than the corresponding SICs, revealing the distinctiveness of
each of the constructs and, thus, discriminant validity.
5.5 Testing for general method bias
The data collection process used in this study could induce a common-method bias, as
the data are based on single informants and self-reported (Podsakoff and MacKenzie
2003). We therefore conducted two procedures and a statistical test to deal with this
issue. Statistically, we used a Harman one-factor test to evaluate the extent to which
common method variance was a concern (Podsakoff and MacKenzie 2003). A factor
analysis was conducted on all twenty-one items used to measure the core variables
covered by the hypotheses. No single factor accounted for the majority of the explained
variance, that is, the first factor accounted for 28.5 per cent. Procedurally, we reduced
the risk of socially desirable responses and/or to be lenient when crafting their responses
by protecting respondent anonymity (Podsakoff and MacKenzie 2003). Moreover, we
reduced item ambiguity by pretesting the survey among eight project managers from the
four participating cities (Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000). Although the above
analysis and procedures do not totally rule out the possibility of same-source, self-report
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biases, it does suggest that general method variance is probably not an adequate
explanation for the findings obtained in this study (Podsakoff and Organ 1986).
5.6 Control variables
We selected four control variables to test whether the measured effects on our
dependent variables are not caused by certain specific characteristics of the project
or the reporting managers. With regard to the projects, we included two control
variables in our analyses. Increased task complexity might increase the difficulty of
realizing effective and efficient network performance (see Klijn, Steijn, and
Edelenbos 2010; more information on this variable is reported at the beginning of
this section). Second, we included the phase of the project as a control variable, as
performance in terms of effective and durable solutions for spatial issues become
more visible if projects are in a later phase of implementation. This is measured by
the realized activities within the project, such as the development of the final project
plan and the realization of the first physical constructions. In 81 per cent of the
sample projects, a master plan has been developed and has been established by the
city council, and in 40 per cent, the first physical constructions have been built. With
regard to the reporting managers, we included the number of years the respondent
has been involved in the project as the manager. This is a general check on whether
the respondent has participated for a sufficiently substantive amount of time to
actually be able to make experience-based judgements (M = 3.0 years,
SD = 2.1 years). Furthermore, we included the general experience (measured in
years) of the project manager with complex urban projects as a control variable.
Although most project managers involved in this survey are relatively experienced in
the management of urban projects (more than 13 years on average and a modus of
7 years), there are strong differences (standard deviation of 7.2 years).
6. Results
We used structural equation modelling (SEM) for conducting data analysis and to
test the conceptual model.4 This has several advantages compared to regression
analysis (Byrne 2010). First, SEM allows simultaneous analysis of all the variables
in the model instead of separately and it enables measurement of direct and indirect
effects. Second, SEM has the capability to deal with latent variables, by using separate
factor loadings for the observed indicators (the survey items), thereby incorporating
both unobserved constructs and observed indicators in the model. Third, whereas
traditional multivariate procedures are incapable of either assessing or correcting for
measurement error, SEM provides explicit estimates of these error variance para-
meters, thereby improving the accuracy of the data analysis (Byrne 2010).
Table 3 presents means, standard deviations, and correlations for all model
constructs and control variables. The mean scores on facilitative management,
boundary-spanning activity, and trust are around the mid-range of the scales indicat-
ing that managers generally perceive a moderate presence of these constructs. The
mean scores on executive support and network performance are somewhat above the
mid-range, indicating that executive support and network performance are generally
perceived as relatively high.5
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Figure 2 shows the results of the structural model tests. Control variables were also
regressed on all variables in the model. The presented model had the best fit. The
overall fit of the measurement model was tested by the following fit indices, which
resulted in CMIN/DF = 1.31, CFI = .92, RMSEA = .048, and PCLOSE = .59. These
values indicate a good fit of the measurement model with the data (Byrne 2010).
The significant relationships (p < .05) are presented (the standardized regression
coefficients are reported) and the explained variance is noted in the boxes. First, H1
and H2 are confirmed in this model. Facilitative project management (H1) significantly
impact upon boundary-spanning behaviour and has a moderate-to-strong effect with a
standardized regression coefficient of .52 (p < .001). Executive support positively impacts
upon facilitative management (H2) with a standardized regression coefficient of .29
(p < .05). H3 cannot be confirmed, as the relationship between executive support and
boundary-spanning behaviour is not found to be significant. Executive support seems to
impact upon boundary-spanning behaviour via facilitative management (see below).
In line with previous findings (VanMeerkerk and Edelenbos 2014), boundary-spanning
behaviour significantly impact upon network performance and trust (H4 and H5). The
relationships are moderate to strong, with standardized effects of .54 and .67 (p < .001),
respectively. H6 cannot be confirmed, as the relationship between trust and network
performance is just above the significance level (β = .25, p = .09). However, these findings
do indicate a relationship as found in previous research (e.g. Klijn, Edelenbos, and Steijn
2010).
6.1 Indirect effects
We subsequently tested the indirect effects of executive support on boundary-span-
ning behaviour and of facilitative management on network performance and trust by
performing the bias-corrected bootstrap method as described by Shrout and Bolger
.26**
.29**
.52**
.53**
.66**
.29*
Trust
R2 = .43
Network
Performance
R2 = .28
Boundary
spanning
activity
R2 = .34
Facilitative
project
management
R2 = .16
Executive
support
Task Complexity
Project Phase
Figure 2. Structural model.
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are reported. **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05. Function estimate means and intercepts used
to deal with some missing values.
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(2002). We requested 2000 bootstrap samples and found all indirect effects to be
significant. Hence, instead of directly effecting boundary-spanning behaviour, execu-
tive support indirectly affects boundary-spanning behaviour via facilitative manage-
ment. The standardized indirect effect is .15. The standardized indirect effect of
facilitative management on governance network performance is .28 (p < .05) and
that of facilitative management on trust is .34 (p < .01).
6.2 Control variables
We omitted the control variables that had no significant effects on the dependent variables.
These were the controls on the respondent (years of involvement, years of experience). The
project phase showed a significant relationship with boundary-spanning activity and task
complexity with facilitative management. Urban governance projects which are in an
implementation phase require more boundary-spanning activity (β = .26, p < 0.01), as in
this phase (urban development), projects become more concrete and demand more
activities of different actors and organizations and therefore indicate more need to span
various organizational boundaries. Furthermore, increased task complexity requires a
more facilitative management style (β = .29, p < 0.01) in which actors get more room for
participation and in which more (informal) interaction becomes important.
7. Discussion and conclusions
Boundary spanning in governance networks has not been much contextualized in
previous research, which brought us to wonder which facilitating factors are impact-
ing upon boundary-spanning activity and subsequently on network performance. We
developed and underpinned a theoretical model which was tested by SEM. In this
section, we discuss the findings and draw several conclusions from our study.
The present study is obviously not without limitations. Our study is based on perceptual
measures coming from leading project managers. Although we tried to minimize the risks
of common method bias with the methods as discussed, we have to be careful in making
generalizations. Next, our data are cross-sectional and causal inferences concerning the
relationships in our structural model are based on theory. Longitudinal and multiple
source data on networks could provide more evidence on the feedback mechanisms
between facilitating conditions, boundary-spanning behaviour, and the development of
trust and performance in governance networks. Furthermore, this study has focused on
specific kinds of governance networks; all the networks studied were in the field of urban
development and restructuring. These results cannot automatically be assumed to hold
also for other types of public projects or policy domains, such as (social) service delivery
networks (Meier and O’Toole 2007). Further research involving samples from other
sectors and in other countries is needed to fully validate our results. Despite these
constraints, we believe that our research has provided interesting empirical insights,
building blocks, and discussion points for further theory development.
Our first conclusion is that facilitative management is an important stimulating condi-
tion for triggering boundary-spanning activity in governance networks. A facilitative
project management style, which accepts and not reduces the complexity of stakeholder
environments, is focused on (informal) relationship building and looks for ways to
empower the stakeholder environment in defining, preparing, and implementing the
project, evokes boundary-spanning activity of network actors from these stakeholder
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environments. This finding adds to the literature on boundary spanning in governance
networks. Previous research has indicated the importance of personal characteristics,
competences, and personal networks as antecedents of boundary-spanning activity
(Brion et al. 2012; Tushman and Scanlan 1981; Williams 2002). In this research, we have
shown the importance of other actor’s behaviour, that is, the project management style in
triggering boundary-spanning behaviour. Realizing integrative participation and empow-
ering boundary spanning persons in governance networks by providing them more
discretionary space in the shaping and negotiation of urban projects can trigger more
boundary-spanning activities. Investing in informal, face-to-face meetings (next to formal
meetings) can further facilitate this process. Interestingly, the style of project management
relates to boundary behaviour of network actors. This indicates the importance of beha-
vioural attitudes of (project) managers in relation to the emergence and behaviour of other
boundary role persons in governance networks. This confirms recent pleas in public
administration to draw more on insights from psychology on the behaviour of individuals
and groups to advance our understanding, in particular regarding the behaviour of public
officials and citizens (Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2017). A next step in future research in this
respect would be to confirm and extent the results of this study by conducting experi-
mental studies on boundary-spanning behaviour: examining the effects of various orga-
nizational and personal conditions on the willingness and attitude of boundary role
persons (including the behavioural attitude of other network actors). In this respect, we
can build more on organizational literature on boundary spanning developed by social-
psychologists using role theory (cf. Johnson and Duxbury 2010) to further develop
boundary-spanning theory in the context of governance networks.
Our second conclusion is that executive support is important for fostering a facil-
itative management style. A principal who is committed but gives room for project
managers to enact a facilitative and open management style in this respect indirectly
contributes to a context in which boundary-spanning activity of network actors is more
likely to emerge. Hence, we found the relationship between executive support and
boundary-spanning activity to be indirect. We did not find a (significant) direct effect
of executive support on boundary-spanning activity. An explanation could be the rather
less constant involvement of executives as compared to (daily) project managers. Project
managers have contacts with (potential) boundary spanners in the network that are more
frequent and more direct than executives do, which likely explain their direct influence
on boundary-spanning activity. It seems that when executives want to stimulate bound-
ary-spanning activity, it is important that they stimulate a facilitative project manage-
ment style and show commitment by providing room and support for project managers.
An avenue for further research is to specify the measurement and impact of different
types of executive support. Although the items of the developed scale in this study
substantially loaded on the same factor and formed a reliable scale, the factor loadings
showed quite some variation. Amore sophisticated distinction between different types of
executive support and/or styles, such as providing room for project managers, being
responsive and gaining resources for the project, is recommendable.
Our third conclusion is that boundary spanning can be considered important in
reaching network performance. This confirms previous research and literature
(Steadman 1992; Van Meerkerk and Edelenbos 2014; cf. Klijn, Steijn, and Edelenbos
2010; Brion et al. 2012). Moreover, boundary spanning is also an important explanatory
factor for trust building. Boundary spanners work across organization structures and
show empathy and interest in motives, interests, and perspectives of other actors in the
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network and, in this way, develop trustworthy relationships with these actors (Williams
2002; Edelenbos and vanMeerkerk 2015). Facilitativemanagement indirectly contributes
to network performance via its effect on boundary-spanning behaviour. This finding
adds to the literature and debates on network management and gives more detailed
information howmechanisms work in governance networks. Next to the direct effects of
management strategies (Klijn, Steijn, and Edelenbos 2010; Meier and O’Toole 2007), this
study found indirect effects of a facilitative management style to network performance
and trust building in governance networks (cf. Ysa, Sierra, and Esteve 2014). This result
shows parallels with organizational research on facilitative leadership and team perfor-
mance (Pirola-Merlo et al. 2002), leading to further development of network manage-
ment literature. More research can be done in which insights from organizational studies
on team leadership and governance network theory are combined.
Notes
1. A search in the database Scopus shows a rise in publications, especially in the last 10 years,
which make use of the concept: 9 publications using the term ‘boundary spanning’ or ‘bound-
ary spanner’ in title or abstract in 2000, 46 publications in 2006, 86 publications in 2010, and
over 120 publications in 2014 (i.e. 124).
2. We want to stress that we focus on ‘boundary spanners in practice’ (Levina and Vaast 2005) or
‘competent boundary spanners’ (Williams 2002). That is, individuals practicing high boundary-
spanning activity, rather than people whose official organizational function is that of a boundary
spanner (irrespective how they actually engage in boundary-spanning practices), also called
‘officially nominated boundary spanners’ (Levina and Vaast 2005).
3. These four cities are relatively the largest cities in The Netherlands. Amsterdam has 783,000
inhabitants, Rotterdam 611,000, The Hague 497,000, and Utrecht 313,000. The fifth city,
Eindhoven, has 214,000 inhabitants, which is substantially lower.
4. We used AMOS Version 22.0.
5. This might indicate the presence of some self-evaluation bias, as the managers play an important
role in the projects. On the one hand, this is a limitation of our sampling strategy and is
something that we cannot totally rule out. On the other hand, we argue that this issue is not
that problematic for our structural model. First of all, if some self-evaluation bias is present, this
holds for all respondents. Hence, although it might has an effect on the absolute values attached
to these items, it likely does not have an effect on the overall variation, neither for the relation-
ships between the variables of our model. Second, studies to network performance on complex
water projects, including both managers and other participants (stakeholders) as survey respon-
dents, show comparable scores and no significant differences between types of respondents in
their rating of performance of these projects (see e.g. Klijn, Steijn, and Edelenbos 2010).
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